Bad Options, part 2

In my last long thread on the Gaza war, I argued that to determine what reality must look like on the ground to ensure this conflict ends, we have to first be clear about which options must be off the table. The first was a return to the status quo ante.

In this thread, I will cover bad option number two, a return to Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip. For many, avoiding this terrible option is even more evident than the impossibility of returning to the status quo. For others, however, this idea still has considerable purchase.

For most Israelis, Hamas’s butchery is proof of the need to destroy this genocidal political movement. Atrocities of the past week and a half coupled with nearly two decades of rocket attacks, incendiary balloons, terror tunnels, & kidnappings have convinced Israelis that the status quo must go.

Demands by int’l actors that Israel moderate its response, not take the bait, recognize Hamas, avoid all civilian casualties, etc while condemning Israeli responses as uniquely criminal, disproportionate, expansionist, or genocidal have erased their credibility in the Israeli mainstream.

These emotions are particularly poignant as Israelis feel they have been given no “credit” for the 2005 Disengagement, Israel’s withdrawal of all 8000 Israeli settlers, 21 settlements, & all military assets from Gaza, with the v brief exception of the Philadelphi Corridor between Gaza and Egypt.

This does not mean the beleaguered Israeli left rejects peace with the Palestinians or that moderate rightists do not want to end conflict. Rather, the idea that any one else would credibly provide the security guarantees Israelis demand vis-a-vis Gaza has become utterly domestically untenable.

For a truly tiny minority of extreme right Israelis, who are disproportionately represented in the current Israeli government, this war also presents an opportunity to resettle the Strip and rectify the “historic mistake” of the Disengagement.

I’ll be clear. This urge to “retake” Gaza, no matter how necessary some in Israel believe it to be, is gravely mistaken if the goal is to end the constant cycle of conflict over Gaza. There are at least three reasons (aside from very important moral and legal ones) why this is unquestionably so.

(1) Israel has already attempted almost every repressive policy possible to rule Gaza since 1967; each and every one has failed to bring peace or quiet. Settlements built with the explicit intent to divide and weaken Gaza failed, military repression failed, external containment failed.

Nor, should I add, would positive inducements likely make a difference. Gazans have had decades to learn what Israeli rule entails and they do not trust Israeli carrots. In the end, they will violently resist it, whether or not Hamas institutionally or organizationally survives this war.

(2) Israeli control of Gaza will not improve its defense against other threats. Even if Israeli forces could sufficiently pacify local resistance, it would likely lead to sympathetic violence in the West Bank. It will also encourage further violence by Iran and other external bad actors.

(3) Israelis already demonstrated in 2005 that they are unwilling to pay the high costs associated with ruling Gaza from the inside. Any post-war occupation is necessarily going to be a long one, and the Israeli domestic appetite for long term investment in stabilizing Gaza will dry up rapidly.

Moreover, the amount of force necessary to “permanently” expunge the threat, is well beyond what the international community at large, the United States included, can accept. Nor will the vast majority of Israelis tolerate this level of violence in the medium to long term.

Next thread, bad option number three.

This post was originally published to Facebook and Bluesky on my personal accounts on 18 October 2023.